Current template: single.php

A ‘No-bailout’ Rules

  • Blankart, C. 2011. An Economic Theory of Switzerland, CESifo DICE Report 3/2011.
  • Blankart C., 2015. What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland, CESfio FORUM 16(2): 39-42.
  • Mause, K. and F. Groeteke. (2012). New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity. Constitutional Political Economy 23: 279-301.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Congressional Budget Office. 2009. Budgetary Impact of ARRA, February.
  • Congressional Budget Office. 2012. Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program, October.

Fiscal Rules and Dynamic Credence Capital in the U.S.

  • Blankart, C. 2011. An Economic Theory of Switzerland, CESifo DICE Report 3/2011.
  • Blankart C., 2015. What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland, CESfio FORUM 16(2): 39-42.
  • Congressional Budget Office. 2009. Budgetary Impact of ARRA, February.
  • Congressional Budget Office. 2012. Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program, October.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016b. “Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • OECD. 2017. Data.oecd.org(//data.oecd.org/)
  • Taylor, J. 1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 39: 195–214.
  • Taylor, J. 2000. Reassessing discretionary fiscal policy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14 (3): 21–36.
  • Taylor, J. 2009. Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
  • Taylor, J. 2010. Swings in the rules-discretion balance. Conference on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Taylor, J. 2014. The fed needs to return to monetary rules. Wall Street Journal. (June 27. A13).
  • Wall Street Journal. 2017f. Eurozone Isn’t the Only Market in ECB Spell Monday Oct. 23.

Market Based Constraints: Bondholders and Creditors

  • Blankart, C. 2011. An Economic Theory of Switzerland, CESifo DICE Report 3/2011.
  • Blankart C., 2015. What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland, CESfio FORUM 16(2): 39-42.
  • Mause, K. and F. Groeteke. (2012). New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity. Constitutional Political Economy 23: 279-301.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.

Legal Environment: Jurisdictions in the Shadow of Insolvency Law

  • Blankart, C. 2011. An Economic Theory of Switzerland, CESifo DICE Report 3/2011.
  • Blankart C., 2015. What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland, CESfio FORUM 16(2): 39-42.
  • Mause, K. and F. Groeteke. (2012). New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity. Constitutional Political Economy 23: 279-301.
  • Fall, F., D. Bloch, P. Hoeller, J.K. Pareliussen and M. Pisu (2014), “Vulnerability of Social Institutions”,
    OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 11, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.

Taxation and Expenditure Autonomy for Sub-national Governments

  • Oates, W. (2005). Toward a second generation theory of federalism. International Tax and Public Finance, 12(4), 349-373.
  • Blankart, C. 2011. An Economic Theory of Switzerland, CESifo DICE Report 3/2011.
  • Blankart C., 2015. What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland, CESfio FORUM 16(2): 39-42.
  • Mause, K. and F. Groeteke. (2012). New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity. Constitutional Political Economy 23: 279-301.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016a. “The Swedish and Swiss Fiscal Rule Outcomes Contain Key Lessons for the U.S.”, Independent Review, Vol.21 Num. 2 Fall.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.
  • Merrifield J., and B Poulson. 2017. Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution, Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2018. “New Constitutional Debt Brakes for Euroland Revisited”, Journal of Applied Business and Economics, forthcoming.

 

DOWNLOAD: Topical Bibliogrpahy on Institutional Changes requiered for New Fiscal Rules in the U.S.

Topical Bibliography What Institutional Changes are required for a Credible Debt Brake in the U.S.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.