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What is the Optimum Combination of Fiscal Rules?

  • Bovet, J. J. Fournier, and A. Mourougane. 2016. “A Reassessment of Fiscal Space in OECD Countries’, OECD Working Paper no. 1352, Nov 23.
  • Carnot, N. (2014), “Evaluating Fiscal Policy: A Rule of Thumb”, European Economy, Economic Papers,No. 526.
    Debrun, X. et al. (2008), “Tied to the Mast? The Role of National Fiscal Rules in the European Union”,Economic Policy, No. 54, pp. 298-362.
  • Fall, F. and J-M. Fournier (2015), “Macroeconomic Uncertainties, Prudent Debt Targets and Fiscal Rules”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1230, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Gosh, A., J. Kim, E. Mendoza, J. Ostry, M. Qureshi, “Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal Space, and Debt Sustainability in Advanced Economies”, NBER Working Paper Series 16782. February.
  • Guiscard, S. et al. (2007), “What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 553, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Hers, J. and W. Suyker (2014), “Structural Budget Balance: A Love at First Sight
    Turned Sour”, CPB Policy Brief, 2014/07
  • Klein, C., R. W. Price and A. Wörgötter (2013), “Improving the Fiscal Framework to Enhance
    Growth in an Era of Fiscal Consolidation in Slovakia”, OECD Economics Department
    Working Papers, No. 1018, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Marneffe, W. (2011), Marneffe, W., B. van Aarle, W. van der Wielen and L. Vereeck (2011),
    “The Impact of Fiscal Rules on Public Finances in the Euro Area”, CESifo DICE Report,
    Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp. 18-26.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016a. “The Swedish and Swiss Fiscal Rule Outcomes Contain Key Lessons for the U.S.”, Independent Review, Vol.21 Num. 2 Fall.
    Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016b. “Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2018. “New Constitutional Debt Brakes for Euroland Revisited”, Journal of Applied Business and Economics, forthcoming.
    Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.
  • Nerlich, C. and W. H. Reuter (2013), “The Design of National Fiscal Frameworks and their Budgetary Impact”, European Central Bank Working Paper Series, No. 1588.
    Ostry, J. A Gosh. J. Kim, and S. Qureshi. 2010. ‘Fiscal Space’, IMF Staff Position Note, September 1.

Our Survey reveals that the Swiss Debt Brake is the Most Effective Fiscal Rule

  • Baur, M., P. Bruchez, and B. Schlaffer. (2013). Institutions for crisis prevention: the case of Switzerland. Global Policy Vol. 4 Supplement 1, July.
  • Bednar, J. (2009). The robust federation: principles of design, Cambridge University Press.
  • Beljean, T., and A. Geier. (2013). The Swiss debt brake- has it been a success? Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 149 (2) 115-135.
    Blankart, C. 2000. The process of government centralization: a constitutional view, constitutional view, Constitutional Political Economy 11(1):27-39.
  • Blankart, C. 2011. An Economic Theory of Switzerland, CESifo DICE Report 3/2011.
  • Blankart, C., E. Fasten, A. Klaiber. 2006. Foderalismus ohne insolvenz? Wirtschaftsdienst, 86(9); 567-571.
  • Blankart C., 2015. What the Eurozone Could Learn from Switzerland, CESfio FORUM 16(2): 39-42.
  • Bodmer, F. (2006). The Swiss debt brake: how it works and what can go wrong. SchweizerischeZeit schrift Fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 142 (3) 307-330.
  • Bruchez, P., and B. Schlaffer. (2012). Excessive public debt: prevention is better than cure. Federal Finance Administration Working Paper No. 18, June.
  • Feld, L., and G. Kirchgassner. (2001). Does direct democracy reduce public debt? Evidence from Swiss municipalities. Public Choice, 109: 347-370.
  • Feld, L., and G. Kirchgassner. (2008). On the effectiveness of debt brakes? The Swiss experience. In J.E. Sturm and R Neck (eds.), Sustainability of public debt, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), pp. 223-255.
  • Fossedal, G. (2009). Direct Democracy in Switzerland. New Brunswick (U.S.A) and London (U.K.): Transaction Publishers.
  • Geier, A. (2011). The debt brake-the Swiss fiscal rules at the federal level. Federal Department of Finance. Federal Financial Administration, Switzerland. (February).
  • Geier, A. (2012). Application of the Swiss fiscal rule to artificial data a Monte Carlo simulation. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics. 148 (1): 37-55.
  • Kirchgaessner, G. (2013a). Fiscal institutions at the Cantonal level in Switzerland. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics. 149 (2): 139-166.
  • Kirchgaessner, G. (2013b). On the political economy of public deficits and debt. German Economic Review 15(1): 116-130.
  • Kirchgaessner, G. (2015). Direct democracy: chances and challenges. CESifo Working Paper No. 5376, May.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016a. “The Swedish and Swiss Fiscal Rule Outcomes Contain Key Lessons for the U.S.”, Independent Review, Vol.21 Num. 2 Fall.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2018. “New Constitutional Debt Brakes for Euroland Revisited”, Journal of Applied Business and Economics, forthcoming.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.

The Merrifield Poulson Fiscal Rule

  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016b. “Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. Is a Debt Brake a Credible Solution to the U.S. Debt Crisis? Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting Nov. 2017.

Designing an Expenditure Limit

  • Asatryan, Z, C. Castellon, T Stratmann, 2016. Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Historical Constitutions, Discussion Paper No. 16-034, Center for European Research.
  • Ayuso I Casals, J. 2012. National expenditure rules: why, how and when. European Economic Commission Economic Papers 473 (December).
  • Carnot, N. (2014), “Evaluating Fiscal Policy: A Rule of Thumb”, European Economy, Economic Papers,No. 526.
  • Cordes, T, T. Kinda, P. Muthoora, and A. Weber, 2015. Expenditure rules: effective tools for sound fiscal policy? International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/15/29.
  • Debrun, X. (2015). How expenditure rules can help get public spending right. Public Financial Management Blog: Making Public Money Count – Fiscal Affairs
  • Department – International Monetary Fund, June 30.
  • Fall, F. and J-M. Fournier (2015), “Macroeconomic Uncertainties, Prudent Debt Targets and Fiscal Rules”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1230, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Guiscard, S. et al. (2007), “What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 553, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • International Monetary Fund. (2014). Public expenditure reform making difficult choices.
  • World Economic and Financial Surveys. (April).
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2014. State fiscal policies for budget stabilization and economic growth: A dynamic scoring analysis. Cato Journal. 34. No.1. (winter).
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016b. “Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Rawdanowicz, Ł. (2012), “Choosing the Pace of Fiscal Consolidation”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 992, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Schaechter, A., T. Kinda, N. Budina and A. Weber, 2012, Fiscal rules in response to the crisis- toward the next generation fiscal rules, a new dataset, International Monetary Fund, Working Papers WP/12/187, July.

Designing a Deficit Debt Brake

  • Baumann, E. and C. Kastrop (2007), “A New Budget Rule for Germany”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Policy: Current Issues and Challenges, acts of the 9th Public Finance Workshop held in Perugia, 29-31 March.
  • Barrell, R., D. Holland and I. Hurst (2012), “Fiscal Consolidation: Part 2. Fiscal Multipliers and Fiscal Consolidations”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 933, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Cournède, B., A. Goujard and Á. Pina (2013), “How to Achieve Growth- and Equity-friendly Fiscal Consolidation? A Proposed Methodology for Instrument Choice with an Illustrative Application to OECD Countries”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1088, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Fall, F. and J-M. Fournier (2015), “Macroeconomic Uncertainties, Prudent Debt Targets and Fiscal Rules”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1230, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Hagemann, R.P. (2012), “Fiscal Consolidation: Part 6. What Are the Best Policy Instruments for Fiscal Consolidation?”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 937, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Merola, R. and D. Sutherland (2012), “Fiscal Consolidation: Part 3. Long-Run Projections and Fiscal Gap Calculations”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 934, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016b. “Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Rawdanowicz, Ł. (2012), “Choosing the Pace of Fiscal Consolidation”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 992, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Sutherland, D. and P. Hoeller (2012), “Debt and Macroeconomic Stability”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1003, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Sutherland, D., P. Hoeller and R. Merola (2012), “Fiscal Consolidation: Part 1. How Much is Needed and How to Reduce Debt to a Prudent Level?”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 932, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Fiscal Rules for Economic Stability and Economic growth

  • Carnot, N. (2014), “Evaluating Fiscal Policy: A Rule of Thumb”, European Economy, Economic Papers,No. 526.
  • Fatás, A. and I. Mihov (2003), “The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118(4), pp. 1419-1447.
  • Guiscard, S. et al. (2007), “What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 553, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2016b. “Can the Debt Growth be Stopped? Rules Based Policy Options for Addressing the Federal Fiscal Crisis”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Merrifield, J., and B. Poulson. 2017. “Restoring America’s Fiscal Constitution”, with John Merrifield, Lexington Books, New York.
  • Kopits, G. (2011a), “Can Fiscal Discipline be Reconciled with Fiscal Sovereignty?”, in Banca d’Italia (ed.), Fiscal Policy: Rules and Institutions for Sound Fiscal Policy After the Crisis, acts of the 13th Public Finance Workshop held in Perugia, 31 March – 2 Avril.
  • Wyplosz, C. (2013), “Fiscal Rules, Theoretical Issues and Historical Experiences”, in A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi (eds.), Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, NBER, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

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How Should Fiscal Rules be designed to Achieve Debt Targets?

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